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AT WAR WITH THE PASS LAWS? REFORM
AND THE POLIC ING OF WHITE
SUPREMACY IN  s SOUTH AFRICA*
KE I TH SHEAR
University of Birmingham
A B S T R AC T . This article analyses a key reformist gesture by General Smuts’s Second World War
South African government – the May  order suspending enforcement of the pass laws in
major cities. Hated by Africans for curbing their mobility, employment opportunities, and urban
residence rights, the pass laws were a fundamental instrument of white supremacy. What then did
the suspension order signify? Reconstructing debates and divisions within and beyond the state, the
article traces the steps leading to the suspension order, and discusses the responses to its
implementation resulting in its later withdrawal. The account considers common explanations for
the suspension order’s genesis: industry’s demand for labour, the wartime state’s reduced policing
capability, and ofﬁcial anxieties about Africans’ loyalty at a time of vulnerability to invasion. Of
these, only the last has clear merit. The real puzzle is the relaxation’s continuance beyond the
emergency situation of . For this, the credit belongs to the momentum of liberal organization and
opinion in encouraging advocates of reform within the state to hold their nerve. Only gradually could
the opposition Nationalists, the party of apartheid, mobilize whites’ hostility to black urbanization,
thereby enhancing the inﬂuence of restorationist elements within the state calling for renewed coercion.
Was apartheid inevitable? To informed observers of South Africa around ,
it certainly seemed a comprehensively entrenched system of racial economic
exploitation and political domination. But since the political upheavals of
the s, when its vulnerabilities became unmistakable, the possible mid-
twentieth-century alternatives to apartheid have received closer scholarly
scrutiny. The s in particular intrigue historians as years in which signiﬁcant
opportunities to reform white supremacy arose and were foreclosed, not to be
presented again for more than three decades. ‘Worlds of possibilities’, ‘South
Africa’s Janus moment’, and ‘the schizophrenic s’ – phrases in the titles of
* I thank Keith Breckenridge and the WISER (Wits Institute for Social and Economic
Research) seminar for engaging constructively with an earlier version of this article; and also
Julian Hoppit, TomMcCaskie, Insa Nolte, James Oakes, Benedetta Rossi, Kate Skinner, and this
journal’s reviewers for helpful discussions and suggestions.
 F. A. Johnstone, ‘White prosperity and white supremacy in South Africa today’, African
Affairs,  (), pp. –.
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a recent edited volume and review article – evocatively convey this historiogra-
phical emphasis.
That tremendous social and political fermentation in the s challenged
the pre-war segregationist order was and is broadly accepted. Prime Minister Jan
Smuts, a principal architect of the South African system, famously announced in
January , at a trough in the country’s wartime prospects, that ‘[i]solation
[w]as gone and segregation ha[d] fallen on evil days, too’. Although Smuts
believed there remained mileage in a sincerer form of white ‘trusteeship’ of
African interests, historians writing in the later apartheid era documented the
militant steps Africans took themselves, in the plain absence of central or local
government provision, to ensure their subsistence and reproduction during
and after the war, including mass migration to the cities, workplace strikes,
bus boycotts, and urban land invasions leading to the establishment of
informal settlements. Historians also showed how this ‘urban crisis’ of the
s, as it appeared to whites, both set the agenda for reactionary electoral
politics and administration, and informed the compromises and contradictions
of early apartheid policies and their implementation. They largely accepted,
however, that ofﬁcial receptiveness to reform barely outlived the emergency
war years of the early s, and that the bolder socio-economic initiatives,
inquiries, and reports that the government entertained – in ﬁelds ranging
from housing, industrial relations, and penal reform, to welfare payments,
education, and health care – were political dead ends. Recent studies – written
in a post-apartheid context that has seen a revival of liberal nationalist, social
democratic, black entrepreneurial, and other projects cognate with those on
offer in the s – are more open to the possibility that ofﬁcially sponsored
reformism was not merely an opportunistic gesture moored to the exigencies
of wartime, but was borne along by a higher tide of reformist opinion that
 S. Dubow and A. Jeeves, eds., South Africa’s s: worlds of possibilities (Cape Town, );
T. R. H. Davenport, ‘South Africa’s Janus moment: the schizophrenic s’, South African
Historical Journal,  (), pp. –. The edited volume comprises papers presented at a
similarly titled workshop held at Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada in September .
Further papers from this event were published in South African Historical Journal,  (), and
are discussed in Davenport’s review along with the edited collection and other unpublished
papers from the workshop.
 J. van der Poel, ed., Selections from the Smuts papers (vols. V to VII, Cambridge, ), VI,
pp. –.
 This literature is synthesized in W. Beinart, Twentieth-century South Africa (nd edn, Oxford,
), pp. –.
 D. Posel, The making of apartheid, –: compromise and conﬂict (Oxford, );
J. Hyslop, ‘“A destruction coming in”: Bantu education as response to social crisis’, in
P. Bonner, P. Delius, and D. Posel, eds., Apartheid’s genesis, – (Johannesburg,
), pp. –; H. Sapire, ‘Apartheid’s “testing ground”: urban “native policy” and
African politics in Brakpan, South Africa, –’, Journal of African History, 
(), pp. –; T. D. Moodie, ‘The South African state and industrial conﬂict in
the s’, International Journal of African Historical Studies,  (), pp. –.
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might plausibly have taken post- South Africa in a different political
direction.
How quickly the limits of reform were reached, or wartime concessions
withdrawn, varied from issue to issue, but a cause’s advancement depended on
some key interrelated variables: the presence of sympathizers within the state
bureaucracy sufﬁciently senior to promote the cause; the openness of ofﬁcial
policy-making to external constituencies inﬂuential enough to embolden and
bolster the internal advocates; and a broader political calculus imparting the
requisite inﬂuence to these external constituencies. The same variables mutatis
mutandis determined the success of reactionary agenda. The point is well
illustrated in T. Dunbar Moodie’s analysis of shifts in the success or failure of
advocacy, by senior civil servants in different parts of the state, of a co-optive
or repressive response to African industrial militancy in the s. Secretary
for Native Affairs (SNA) Douglas Laing Smit and Secretary for Labour Ivan
Lawrence Walker – supported by representatives of Africans in parliament,
liberal bodies like the South African Institute of Race Relations, and sections
of the white labour movement – urged the incorporation of African trade
unions representing non-migrant workers into the country’s formal industrial
conciliation machinery, and made much of the running in the early war years.
Opposing them, the South African Police (SAP) and the Mines department
lined up alongside the mining industry in arguing that any recognition of
organized African labour would open the way to a political radicalization of the
workforce, including in the all-important mining sector, with uncontrollable
consequences for the country’s economic and political stability. The political
climate of the later war and early post-war years, Moodie argues, decisively
favoured these proponents of reaction over those promoting reform.
The present article considers an equally important instance in which
the war brought into question a previously settled policy fundamental to the
maintenance of white supremacy and the system of racial economic exploita-
tion: the pass laws and their enforcement. For decades, these laws, which had
entitled the police at any time to demand that Africans show them a properly
endorsed document or face arrest, had hindered Africans’ freedom of
movement, restricted where they could reside, and tied them to their white
employers, underpinning a system of cheap labour and humiliating subjection.
By the late s, prosecutions for pass offences had peaked at some ,
annually, up from just over , a decade previously. In May , however,
the police were ordered to suspend the practice of demanding passes from
Africans in major cities in an experiment that lasted nearly four years.
Reimposed from , and then systematically extended and tightened up,
 Dubow and Jeeves, eds., South Africa’s s; K. Gillespie, ‘Containing the “wandering
native”: racial jurisdiction and the liberal politics of prison reform in s South Africa’,
Journal of Southern African Studies,  (), pp. –.
 Moodie, ‘South African state’.
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and brutally enforced, by the Nationalists, the pass laws were producing
more than , prosecutions annually at the height of apartheid in the late
s. Seen against this backdrop of ever more drastic enforcement, the
anomalous period of the pass laws’ suspension in the earlier s stands out;
often noted in passing, it merits closer study in its own right.
Historians have advanced four explanations for the May  relaxation. The
ﬁrst cites the demand for African labour in the manufacturing sector, which
had grown enormously to supply the country’s war effort and replace formerly
imported goods, and whose needs received precedence over those of white
farmers and of white city dwellers fearful of black urbanization. The second
focuses on the state’s weakened capacity to impose controls on Africans given
the absence of many policemen and other white ofﬁcials on service abroad. The
third interprets the relaxation as a direct response to wartime concerns about
Africans’ disaffection and loyalty. The fourth credits white liberal politicians
and administrators with an ability to extract reforms from a politically
vulnerable government unusually reliant upon their support.
These explanations are not considered mutually incompatible, but much is
at stake historiographically in which of them is emphasized. Stressing the
labour needs of industry makes a point – about the inﬂuence, for good or ill, of
business interests upon state policy – that is attractive across the ideological
spectrum. To the economically orthodox, the suspension demonstrates how the
allocation of labour less encumbered by non-market controls like the pass laws
fostered economic expansion. Leftists and Afrikaner nationalists might see in it
evidence of the Smuts government’s subordination to urban industrial capital
and British imperial war aims. The point is not entirely congenial to the leftist
historiography, however, because it contradicts its core argument that South
African capitalist development depended on repressive discriminatory controls
like the pass laws.
Focusing on weakened capacity foregrounds the limited choices available to
the overstretched wartime state in directing its personnel, and is consistent with
an analysis of how Africans’ accelerated urbanization, and the related workplace
 M. Savage, ‘The imposition of pass laws on the African population in South Africa,
–’, African Affairs,  (), pp. –, at p. .
 D. Hindson, Pass controls and the urban African proletariat (Johannesburg, ), pp. –; I.
Evans, Bureaucracy and race: native administration in South Africa (Berkeley, CA, ), p. ;
Savage, ‘Imposition’, p. ; P. Bonner, ‘Eluding capture: African grass-roots struggles in s
Benoni’, in Dubow and Jeeves , eds., South Africa’s s, pp. –, at p. ; D. Welsh,
‘Urbanisation in South Africa: –’, in E. Hellman and H. Lever, eds., Conﬂict and
progress: ﬁfty years of race relations in South Africa (Johannesburg, ), pp. –, at p. ;
Beinart, Twentieth-century, p. ; P. Alexander,Workers, war and the origins of apartheid: labour and
politics in South Africa, – (Oxford, ), pp. –; P. Lewsen, ‘Liberals in politics and
administration, –’, in J. Butler, R. Elphick, and D. Welsh, eds., Democratic liberalism in
South Africa: its history and prospect (Middletown, CT, ), pp. –, at pp. –.
 E.g. F. A. Johnstone, Class, race and gold: a study of class relations and racial discrimination in
South Africa (London, ), pp. –.
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and community struggles they engaged in, forced the government to stay
its repressive hand. Giving prominence to disaffection highlights ofﬁcials’
appreciation of how Africans’ dispositions might shape the state’s fate if the
enemy invaded. These explanations citing weakened capacity and concerns
about Africans’ reliability – with their emphases on African agency and
consciousness, and the limitations of the settler colonial state – reﬂect themes
in recent Africanist scholarship.
By contrast, crediting white liberals and enlightened bureaucrats with
inﬂuencing state policy in a meaningfully reformist direction is unpopular
with a historiography that largely endorses the views of the rising Mandela
generation of African National Congress (ANC) politicians of the s and
s, who despised the gradualist and paternalist assumptions informing
established mechanisms for consulting African opinion, and refused to confer
legitimacy on whites appointed or elected to represent blacks. The literature
has perhaps as a result too readily depicted top-down reform running in a
channel separate from that of African disaffection. This article argues that in
the early s they ran together, imparting a momentum to reformist causes
that signiﬁcantly outlasted the state’s moment of greatest wartime vulnerability
in early . Africans could inﬂuence the white power structure; some African
leaders (including popular left-leaning ANC politicians) knew it; and they used
the institutions in place and their connections with white liberals – a crucial
component of Smuts’s pro-war coalition – to do so.
In revisiting the origins and effects of the pass laws enforcement suspension
order, this article follows Moodie’s approach and documents the roles of
competing interests within and outside the state bureaucracy both in the
suspension order’s genesis and in responding to its consequences. The
principal departments involved in this instance were the SAP and the native
affairs department (NAD), and the relevant exchanges between them began
before the war. Historians have not explicitly located these two bureaucracies in
relation to the pass laws enforcement issue in the way that Moodie situates them
on opposite sides of the question of recognizing African trade unions. The
inference to be drawn from the historiography, however, is that both the SAP
and NAD endorsed the relaxation, albeit for different reasons: the SAP because
its depleted wartime strength meant it lacked the capacity to enforce the pass
laws; and the NAD because it feared the effects of African disaffection and
disloyalty at a time when the country was vulnerable to enemy invasion. The
evidence does not support this inference. The NAD’s concern about Africans’
loyalty was certainly germane, arising as early as the ﬁrst half of  and
culminating, with the support of white liberal and organized black political
mobilization, in the suspension order. But if weakened capacity was a
consideration for the SAP, why did senior police ofﬁcers themselves insist that
the suspension compounded rather than eased their difﬁculties, and why did
they press vigorously and often for the pass laws’ reimposition? The labour
needs of urban manufacturing, meanwhile, did not ﬁgure at all in the lengthy
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discussions preceding the relaxation – these needs were still incipient in this
phase as a discrete policy issue – but did feature in the twilight of the suspension
order – long after the worries about African disaffection and police short-
handedness had ceased to be pertinent – in deliberations near the end of
Smuts’s government on future policy towards Africans in the cities.
I
In the late s, the threat of war in Europe created difﬁculties for the
otherwise solidly entrenched United party government of Generals Hertzog
and Smuts. The two leaders could agree that the Union of South Africa’s
interests should be paramount in deciding relations with Britain and Germany
in the event of war, and that the country had the sovereign right to take that
decision independently. Hertzog, however, believed that neutrality would best
serve the Union’s interests, while Smuts thought that alignment with Britain was
preferable, and probably inevitable given the country’s existing agreements
with, and dependence for defence upon, the Royal Navy. On  September
, just before the Munich settlement, Hertzog’s cabinet agreed that South
Africa would stand aside from a ‘war in Europe with England as one of the
belligerents’. As long as Hitler conﬁned his territorial demands to ‘Central or
South-Eastern Europe’, even Smuts thought it unlikely that any of the
dominions would join Britain in ﬁghting. But Hitler also demanded, if only
‘to further other and more immediate foreign policy aims’, the return of
Germany’s former colonies, including South West Africa (SWA), which the
Union administered under a League of Nations ‘C’ mandate as an ‘integral’
portion of its own territory. Hertzog accepted that South Africa’s position in
SWA might have to be determinedly defended – diplomatically certainly, but
also if necessary militarily, which sat awkwardly alongside his insistence that
neutrality was feasible.
The diplomatic strategy involved reinforcing declarations at the League of
Nations with high-level secret discussions with British and German leaders
about possibly compensating Germany ﬁnancially or with other African
territories. The proposals for compensation were unrealistic. Concerning
territorial compensation, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden wrote to
Neville Chamberlain after meeting Hertzog in May : ‘My own impression is
that General Hertzog thinks that the major contribution should be made on the
West Coast of Africa, preferably by the French!’ On ﬁnancial compensation,
 W. K. Hancock, Smuts: the ﬁelds of force, – (Cambridge, ), pp. –.
 S. Pienaar, South Africa and international relations between the two world wars: the League of
Nations dimension (Johannesburg, ), p. .
 Ibid., pp. –; M. Chanock, Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa –: the
unconsummated Union (Totowa, NJ, ), pp. –.
 Eden to Chamberlain,  May , The National Archives (London), Foreign Ofﬁce
/A.
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South Africa’s defence minister told Hitler at the end of  that Hertzog had
‘mentioned . . . for South West Africa a sum of £,, plus certain trade
advantages’. How the Union was to raise that sum, which exceeded its annual
budget, was unclear, although here again Hertzog may have been counting on
the largesse of others.
The military strategy meant enhancing South Africa’s police presence within
SWA. In June , following a dramatic show of force by an SAP contingent in
April to forestall a possible Nazi coup in the territory, the SWA Police were
incorporated into the SAP. Even earlier than this, however, it implied
preparations in key areas and industries of the Union itself, notably the
Witwatersrand gold ﬁelds, that acquired greater urgency if not necessarily
momentum following Munich. In November , ‘entrusted with . . .
preparing a scheme for the defence of . . . the Witwatersrand . . . in the event of
industrial or other internal disturbances’, the defence department asked the
chamber of mines for ‘a list of all vulnerable points on the Reef in so far as the
Mines are concerned, which would have to be considered’. In a related
initiative in March , the head of the SAP’s Witwatersrand division informed
the chamber ‘that the Police [were] perturbed by the possibilities of sabotage
on the mines’ given the ‘number of Germans employed in key positions’, and
urged the industry to ‘take precautions to have [these] positions guarded’. In
early April, mere days before the dispatch of the SAP contingent to SWA, police
commandants in Transvaal districts where industries thought to be of ‘national
importance’ were located compiled lists of ‘persons of alien nationality, whose
sympathies . . . [would] not accord with South African interests in the event of
war’. During the SWA tension itself, police guards were ‘posted at vulnerable
points in the Union’.
Also as a consequence of events in Europe and SWA, watch was being kept
well before September  on ‘aliens in native areas’. This was the subject
heading of a conﬁdential report – in response to a departmental circular – sent
to SNA Douglas Smit in May  by the magistrate at Humansdorp, Cape
province ( miles west of Port Elizabeth). The magistrate noted that he was
‘keeping a very watchful eye (long, did I, before any crisis occurred overseas)’,
 O. Pirow, James Barry Munnik Hertzog (Cape Town, ), p. .
 Central Archives Depot, Pretoria (CAD), records of the South African Police (SAP)
//, passim.
 J. S. M. Simpson, South Africa ﬁghts (London, ), pp. –, exaggerates the efﬁcacy of
pre-war preparations.
 Ofﬁcer commanding Witwatersrand command to president, chamber of mines (CM),
 Nov. ; J. P. Harding, chairman, technical advisory committee, CM, to general manager,
 Jan. : CM Archives, Johannesburg (CMA), ﬁle on internal security, –.
 Legal adviser to joint secretary,  Mar. , CMA, ﬁle on internal security, –.
 Deputy commissioner (depcom), Transvaal division, to commissioner of police (compol),
 Apr. , encl. district commandant, Middelburg, to depcom, Pretoria,  Apr. ,
CAD, SAP ///.
 I. P. de Villiers to secretary for external affairs,  May , CAD, SAP ///.
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and mentioned German-language pamphlets distributed in his district by
one Friedrich Adolf Hendrichs, in charge of the Moravian mission store.
G. R. C. Baston at SAP headquarters told Smit that the police were ‘fully alive to
this’ and that although Hendrichs was ‘a Nazi’, it was ‘not absolutely established’
that he was the source of the pamphlets, which were ‘the usual papers of the
Fascist and Nazi organisations which [could] be picked up anywhere’! The
deputy commissioners in Grahamstown and Umtata, Baston added, were ‘both
of the opinion that these [pamphlets] can have no effect on the Native mind,
and there is no sign of unrest’. A defence department ofﬁcer had similarly
reported to Pretoria at the end of April  the opinion of his fellow ofﬁcers
that ‘Nazi propaganda’ was ‘being circulated among the Natives in the
Transkeian Territories’ and that there were ‘many ardent Nazi supporters
among the traders in the Territories’, but Baston again reassured Smit that
the deputy commissioner in Umtata held ‘emphatically that there [was] no
evidence of Nazi propaganda being spread among the Natives’.
Smit himself was not reassured as further reports reached him of pro-German
propaganda among Africans. Hearing, for example, that the ‘Zulu’ servant of
the American envoy to South Africa had said that ‘Germany was the greatest
nation on earth and that the Germans had told them that the Zulus lost their
country . . . because they had no guns and that the Germans would see to it that
in the next war they were provided with guns and aeroplanes’, Smit asked the
police to interview the envoy. ‘This kind of propaganda’, he informed his chief
native commissioner (CNC) in Natal, who was also asked to ‘make conﬁdential
inquiries among the Native Commissioners whom [he] trust[ed]’ and to
consult the Zulu regent, ‘is, of course, so insidious that one does not realise what
is happening until the thing is accomplished . . . Things look very ugly in the
world today and it is most necessary that we should be on our guard.’ Police
investigation revealed, however, that the servant was from Plumtree in Rhodesia
and claimed ‘that he liked his American master and would not care to serve
under a German’. In a follow-up minute, Cape Town’s deputy commissioner
wrote ‘that the talk of these natives, as alleged, is certainly not the result of any
organized propaganda by Nazi Agents or others’.
 Magistrate and native commissioner (NC), Humansdorp, to SNA,  May , CAD,
Native Affairs records (NTS) /.
 Baston to Smit,  May , CAD, NTS /.
 Baston to Smit,  June , encl. copies of J. J. C. Hamman, Eastern province command,
to director of training and operations, Union Defence Forces,  Apr. , and S. Varney,
depcom, Umtata, to compol,  June , CAD, NTS /.
 Smit to Lugg,  June , encl. in SNA to depcom, Cape Town,  June , CAD,
NTS /.
 Depcom, Cape Town, to compol,  July , encl. in Baston to Smit,  July , CAD,
NTS /.
 Palmer to compol,  July , enclosed in Baston to Smit,  July , CAD, NTS
/.
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Although the SAP, beyond investigating information reported by other
departments, itself closely monitored alleged ‘ardent Nazis’ with ‘feelings . . .
very bitter against the British’, and German residents known to possess or use
wireless transmitting equipment, the foregoing evidence shows there was
much complacency in the police about the potential for subversion and
sabotage shortly before the war. Concrete steps would follow rather than
precede a crisis. Asked twice how ‘petrol installations’ would be secured against
sabotage, the police replied the ﬁrst time ‘that, as far as possible, measures will
be taken to reinforce the Staff Guards . . . if a state of emergency arises’; and the
second, following urgent representations from Shell in late August , that,
again ‘as far as possible’, at ‘centres where neither Railway nor South African
Police men are posted as guards’, company ‘watchmen’ were ‘regularly visited
and supervised by police Non-Commissioned Ofﬁcers’. Not surprisingly, a
report prepared for Smuts soon after he became prime minister recorded
damningly that ‘any mobilisation for internal security on the th September,
 would have produced chaos in all directions’.
Smit was thus unusual among senior civil servants in the degree of pre-war
concern he expressed about subversive elements within the Union itself – as
opposed to SWA, where Nazi activity was more blatant, and about which there
was greater consensus within government. As SNA, Smit might be expected to
worry about African opinion in the event of war, but much of his disquiet arose
precisely because his department, despite its name, had lost direct access to a
signiﬁcant segment of the African population and had to rely largely on the
SAP’s intermediation. This was the result of historical competition – long settled
in the SAP’s favour – between the NAD and SAP for control over the sources
of information within African communities, and accounts for police manage-
ment’s conﬁdent assertions in the face of the NAD’s anxieties that Nazi
pamphlets could ‘have no effect on the Native mind’. Indeed, the SAP’s
monopoly in the production and distribution of this information was such that
at the end of  Smit’s ofﬁce had to ask the police to continue regularly
forwarding political reports because it was ‘anxious to keep in touch’ with
African opinion.
Had he not found the world situation so troubling, Smit might have tolerated
a status quo in the NAD’s relations with the SAP, but the political divisiveness
that participation in another European war threatened to cause among white
South Africans generally, affected civil servants too and policemen particularly,
 Varney to compol,  June , encl. in Baston to Smit,  June , CAD, NTS /.
 Baston to secretary, national supplies control board,  July and  Aug. , CAD, SAP
///.
 ‘A statement on the local military position existing on the th September,  upon
which date General Smuts assumed ofﬁce as minister of defence’, n.d., CAD, Accession ,
Smuts papers, vol. , no. .
 K. Shear, ‘Chiefs or modern bureaucrats? Managing black police in early twentieth-
century South Africa’, Comparative Studies in Society and History,  (), pp. –, at p. .
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raising questions about their reliability. As early as June  Smit had implied
that there were native commissioners (NCs) – ofﬁcers answerable to him – who
might not be trusted.How then was he to proceed after war was declared if the
SAP, on whom he depended so greatly for information and investigations,
proved unreliable? ‘While the Department has every conﬁdence in the loyalty of
the Natives throughout the country’, Smit wrote to his CNCs shortly after Smuts
had formed a pro-war government, ‘Native Commissioners should keep in close
touch with all shades of Native opinion and they should spare no efforts in
counteracting any subversive inﬂuences that may be at work, and any evidence
of enemy propaganda should be reported to this ofﬁce at once.’ But how,
having previously ceded precedence in the production of information to the
SAP, thus alienating themselves from the African population, were Smit’s
ofﬁcers to establish and maintain this ‘close touch’, and how was ‘native
opinion’ to be registered and moulded?
I I
The internment of ‘enemy subjects’ in the war’s early months lulled ofﬁcials
into further complacency about subversion and ‘internal sabotage’ that
France’s collapse in mid- shattered. The new urgency was reﬂected in
the NAD’s waxing anxiety about a countrywide effort ‘to spread enemy
propaganda’ to undermine Africans’ conﬁdence in the government.
Information originating from short-wave radio broadcasts by the German
Zeesen station, or ﬁltering across the border with neutral Portuguese
Mozambique where German diplomats and agents could operate, was a
particular concern. The sorts of rumours that Smit worried were ‘current
among the Natives’ included claims that the departure of Union forces to ﬁght
abroad would allow Africans to ‘take their country back again’; that the
government was about to ‘conﬁscate monies deposited in the Savings Bank’
because it was in ﬁnancial difﬁculty, causing Africans to withdraw deposits; and
that a German invasion would bring Africans higher wages, the abolition of
passes, the allocation of farms, and cheaper consumer goods. NCs were
instructed to counter the rumours by holding fortnightly public meetings ‘at
selected centres’ to ‘disseminat[e] authentic news’, albeit nothing that ‘might
disturb the Native mind or create any feeling of apprehension’. Such public
 See quotation preceding n. .
 SNA to chief magistrate, Umtata,  Sept. , and similar minutes to other CNCs, CAD,
NTS /.
 Union of South Africa, Report of the select committee on German Foreign Ofﬁce documents
(conduct of member) (Cape Town, ), pp.  and , paras. , and ,.
 Smit to CNCs, Pietermaritzburg, Kingwilliamstown, and Umtata,  June , CAD, NTS
/.
 Lugg to NCs,  June , citing communication from Smit, CAD, NTS /.
 Smit to all NCs, departmental circular no.  of , ‘Enemy propaganda: dissemination
of authentic news’,  June , CAD, NTS /.
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meetings were preferred to counter-broadcasting, ‘as the enemy could easily
transmit their messages on the same wavelength with devastating effect’. It was
also thought insufﬁcient ‘for natives to hear voices thrown at them through
loudspeakers. They should see the person addressing them . . . [and] in the case
of recorded speeches, some person known to the natives should be present
to supplement the records.’ African-language news bulletins issued by the
NAD were to be distributed using ‘recognised channels of communication . . .
including chiefs, headmen, leading Natives and Europeans of proved loyalty’.
NAD ofﬁcers were also asked to ‘review the loyalty and trustworthiness’ of whites
who regularly interacted with signiﬁcant numbers of Africans.
Some of these ideas for ‘combating enemy propaganda’ and shaping African
opinion had been aired at a conference of representatives of central and local
government, the mining industry, and the press convened at the beginning of
June  by H. S. Cooke, the senior NAD ofﬁcer in Johannesburg. Here, Smit
admitted that ‘enemy propaganda was causing the Government grave concern’.
In speaking points drafted ahead of the conference, Cooke suggested the
‘[c]reation of a war ﬁlm from extracts of existing ﬁlms showing glimpses of
enemy atrocities followed by heartening pictures of, say, Navy, Anti-Aircraft
Guns in action, arrival of Empire troops, etc. etc.’. At the conference itself,
however, H. C. Wellbeloved, labour adviser for the chamber of mines, ‘was
doubtful as to the real effect of this on the native mind’. Wellbeloved ‘thought
Communists were largely responsible’ for defeatistmessages reachingAfricans.
This was the era of the Nazi–Soviet pact, and leftists, particularly those trying to
unionize black workers in war-related industries, were interned. Increasingly,
however, state ofﬁcials suspected working-class Afrikaans-speaking whites, many
of whom were believed to be anti-war republicans and ‘members of subversive
organisations’. As Cooke’s ofﬁce put it, ‘European miners and the lower paid
servants of the railways such as conductors and ticket examiners, whose
employment in both cases allows of their easy and frequent contact with the
natives’, were the ‘two main agents for disseminating subversive stories’. Only
one representative at the Johannesburg conference, the local NC J. M. Brink,
volunteered that the state itself might bear some responsibility for evidence
of disaffection among Africans. ‘[R]ecent unfortunate legislation’, Brink said,
‘was giving the natives the impression that they were being down-trodden,
 ‘Report of conference on enemy propaganda etc. held at the ofﬁce of the director of
native labour, Johannesburg’,  June , CAD, NTS /.
 Departmental circular no. ,  June , CAD, NTS /.
 ‘Report of conference’,  June , and appended ‘Note for conference’ containing
Cooke’s speaking points, CAD, NTS /.
 B. Hirson, Yours for the union: class and community struggles in South Africa, –
(London, ), pp. –; M. Stein, ‘Max Gordon and African trade unionism on the
Witwatersrand, –’, in E. Webster, ed., Essays in Southern African labour history
(Johannesburg, ), pp. –.
 Acting director of native labour to SNA,  Sept. , CAD, NTS /.
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thus providing an excellent ﬁeld for enemy propagandists’. That Brink’s
remark found its way into the NAD’s report on the conference suggests,
however, that it made some impression on his superiors.
Indeed, Smit, on at least one previous occasion soon after the outbreak of
war, had had cause to reﬂect upon the difﬁculties the state made for itself in
attempting to understand and enlist African opinion. In , in removing
the right of African males to qualify to vote on a common electoral register
alongside whites in the Cape province, the government had created new
mechanisms for Africans’ voices to be represented at national level. Cape
Africans were removed from the common voters’ roll and placed on a separate
list to elect three white MPs. Countrywide, Africans would elect four white
members of the Union Senate and twelve African members to a Natives
Representative Council (NRC) that also comprised four nominated African and
six white ofﬁcial members and whose function was to advise parliament on
matters affecting Africans. The ﬁrst elections under this system had taken
place in . With war piquing his anxieties about ‘subversive inﬂuences’
among Africans and about his department’s distance from African opinion,
Smit began to pay more attention to these mechanisms of representation.
Mostly rooted in liberal think-tanks, legal circles, and university departments,
the seven white parliamentary representatives elected by Africans brought a
national-level ‘impetus’ to reformist causes that may have stalled had they not
become an important pro-war element in the political calculus following the
realignment of September . Few as they were, therefore, they were already
getting a more respectful hearing from the government and Smit’s department.
The NAD also strove to enhance the credibility of the NRC and to encourage
other parts of the state to view the NRC’s members – the nominated white
ofﬁcials perhaps even more than the elected black representatives – as ﬁgures of
consequence. Thus, when forwarded a police report on a meeting held by
Thomas Mapikela of the Free State ANC, in which the NRC member was
described as ‘Oproermaker [Agitator] No. ’, Smit felt compelled to inform
Baston at police headquarters that Mapikela
gets a travelling allowance from us to enable him to visit the Natives whose interests
he represents – so as to enable him to represent their views at the meetings of the
Council, of which I am Chairman. There is nothing subversive in the address he
gave . . . and I think you will agree with me that in the circumstances it is very hard
that he should be treated and described in your ofﬁcial correspondence as
‘Oproermaker No. ’. The same treatment has been meted out from time to time
to other members of the Representative Council and such treatment only serves to
antagonise these people whose co-operation is necessary in the smooth working of
my administration among the Natives. There is, of course, no objection to the Police
 ‘Report of conference’,  June , CAD, NTS /.
 Representation of Natives Act, No.  of .
 Gillespie, ‘Containing’, pp. –.
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being present at the meetings held by these Councillors, in the same way as their
attendance is often thought desirable at [white] political gatherings, but to treat
them all as ‘Agitators’ when they are carrying out a function which has been
approved by the Government places me in an unpleasant position.
Baston announced himself ‘in full agreement with [Smit’s] dissension’ and
promised the situation would ‘be remedied’. He had, however, to ask Smit to
provide him with a list of the NRC’s ‘native members’ to compare against his
‘list of agitators’, revealing the lack of signiﬁcance the police attributed to the
NRC as either a source of information about African opinion or a vehicle of
African politics. In duly supplying this list, Smit hypocritically advised that
Richard Baloyi, the ANC’s treasurer-general, ‘is said to have communistic
leanings and . . . his activities should be watched, but . . . this should be done in
such a way that he should not be aware of it’. He was also fearful of the
consequences of allowing the NRC to debate the war issue publicly and
manoeuvred to prevent this. At this stage (November ), Smit was clearly
only dimly, if at all, conscious of the contradictions of his ‘dissension’, and
seemed as much concerned about his own institutional ‘position’ and control as
he was about accessing African popular opinion.
Brink’s solitary intervention at the Johannesburg conference either initiated,
or was indicative of, a growing realization among senior NAD ofﬁcials that
enforcement of the country’s discriminatory oppressive legislation might only
make Africans more receptive to ‘subversive stories’. On  June, ﬁve days after
the conference, Smit and his CNCs met in Pretoria to discuss ‘the war situation
as affecting the Native areas’ and the point Brink had raised was deliberated.
This meeting concluded that the state itself was provoking ‘a good deal of the
irritation amongst Natives generally’, for Smit afterwards secured permission
from his minister, Deneys Reitz, to write to Commissioner of Police I. P. de
Villiers urging that ‘a wiser discretion . . . in the institution against them of
prosecutions for petty offences . . . would have a very wholesome effect on the
minds of the Natives’ – a suggestion De Villiers apparently accepted.
There was a further consideration. It was immediately following this meeting
with his CNCs that Smit issued the aforementioned instructions to NCs to get
out into their districts more and hold frequent meetings with Africans to
 Smit to Baston, Nov. , CAD, NTS /(). Smit’s paternalism shows through in
the unreﬂecting implication that only whites held ‘political gatherings’.
 Baston to Smit,  Nov. , CAD, NTS /().
 Smit to Baston,  Nov. , CAD, NTS /(). Baloyi, whom Smuts called a
‘capitalist’, owned a transport company in Alexandra, the freehold township north of
Johannesburg. It was probably his association with J. B. Marks – a leading communist – which
made ofﬁcials suspicious. Smuts to M. C. Gillett,  Dec. , in Van der Poel, ed., Selections, VI,
p. ; M. Basner, Am I an African? The political memoirs of H. M. Basner (Johannesburg, ),
p. .
 M. Roth, ‘“If you give us rights we will ﬁght”: black involvement in the SecondWorld War’,
South African Historical Journal,  (), pp. –, at p. .
 Smit to De Villiers,  June , encl. in Smit to Lugg,  July , CAD, NTS /.
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combat ‘enemy propaganda’. Given that many NCs were also magistrates, a
reduction in ‘prosecutions for petty offences’ would also ‘lighten the burden in
district ofﬁces’, freeing NCs both from time-consuming court work and from
some of the opprobrium attached to the enforcement of discriminatory
legislation that further alienated the NAD from the people. Because prosecu-
tions and the courts were involved, Smit’s proposal to De Villiers required not
only his own minister’s approval but also De Villiers’s, Justice Minister Colin
Steyn. A subtle game of inter-departmental politics thus commenced. For now,
Smit was content to ask De Villiers to obtain Steyn’s approval. Later, by having
Reitz communicate directly with Steyn, he would go behind the backs of
the SAP.
I I I
The most persistent grievance for Africans was the administration of the
pass laws. Barely two weeks after recommending to De Villiers that the
state would beneﬁt if the SAP were less obtrusive, Smit learnt that workers
returning to lowveld homes from the mines were being arrested because their
passes were not endorsed for travel beyond the railway terminus at Graskop – ‘a
new and irritating’, even if technically correct, ‘interpretation of the law’.
Forwarding the correspondence to Baston, Smit commented that his minister,
Reitz, was
very perturbed at the large number of Natives who are being sent to jail for
contraventions of the Pass Laws, and when times are a little more normal we will have
to consider a revision of the law, but in the meantime, in view of the amount of
enemy propaganda that is being sown among the Natives, we are most anxious that
the Police should use a little common sense . . . [T]o send Natives to jail in these days
for triﬂing offences . . . is just the sort of thing that causes disaffection.
Nine months later, in April , following representations from and ‘a full and
frank discussion’ with the white parliamentarians representing Africans about
the police’s ‘wholesale interference with Natives’, including an incident in
which the ANC president Alfred Xuma had been assaulted by a white constable,
Smit confessed to Baston that he had ‘a great deal of sympathy’ with the views of
the senators and MPs he had seen. To Smit’s ‘way of thinking it [was] a dreadful
reﬂection on . . . European civilisation in South Africa that thousands of
Natives [were] imprisoned every year for what [were] at most but trivial
offences’, and wondered ‘whether [Baston] couldn’t devise the means whereby
some relaxation could be brought about without unduly interfering with the
 Departmental circular no. ,  June , CAD, NTS /.
 Smit to De Villiers,  June , encl. in Smit to Lugg,  July , CAD, NTS /.
 Wellbeloved to Smit,  July , encl. district superintendent, native recruiting
corporation (NRC), Graskop, to manager, NRC,  July , CAD, NTS /.
 Smit to Baston,  July , CAD, NTS /.
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effectiveness of the regulations’. Smit was requesting the impossible: white
supremacy without the forceful means historically employed to create and
maintain it. He was groping for a solution, but it was not yet clear to him that
informal approaches at the highest levels were insufﬁcient. Although Baston’s
ofﬁce replied that there had been ‘a marked decrease’ in pass law prosecutions
since Smit had ﬁrst raised the issue in mid-, lower-ranking policemen
continued to use their powers to address immediate difﬁculties and to respond
to the complaints of whites in their wards and districts without reference to
larger policy concerns. This was especially true in these earlier war years when
the internment of anti-war republicans politicized policing among whites,
tempting the SAP locally to recover white support at Africans’ expense.
In other spheres, too, Smit was engaged in efforts to ameliorate Africans’
circumstances without confronting the apparently fundamental sources of their
deterioration. Around the time that Smit was meeting Africans’ parliamentary
representatives, the latter also had an opportunity to ply Smuts, standing in for
Reitz in the Senate, ‘with questions and complaints’, to which the prime
minister responded ‘sympathetically . . . on Native health and economic con-
ditions, life on the farms, wages and other matters of interest to the Natives’.
Smuts was surprised and ‘pleased’ subsequently to receive a letter of thanks
from the senators for his ‘helpful remarks’, and a note from Smit ‘that even
he was much moved and that [Smuts’s] outlook as publicly stated would have a
far-reaching effect’. These exchanges formed part of the preliminaries to the
appointment in August  of an inter-departmental committee, chaired by
Smit, which was instructed by Smuts to ‘explore possible ways, other than merely
increasing wages, of improving’ conditions for Africans in urban areas. Often
derided as toothless for this exclusion of the issue of wages, the basis of the
cheap labour system, the committee itself frankly acknowledged in its interim
report of March  ‘that within [its] terms of reference it ha[d] not
discovered any remedies . . . both practicable and . . . immediately sufﬁcient’.
However, it was precisely because it could not address pay frontally that the
committee turned its attention to and made potentially highly consequential
recommendations concerning two of the most important long-term supports of
the low-wage economy: the pass laws and obstacles to African trade unionism.
Smit appears personally to have been profoundly affected by the ﬁndings of
his committee, and was both invested in and armed by its recommendations.
One ﬁnding was that outside of the Cape province there had been ,
convictions for pass offences in the three years beginning in , representing
a ‘harassing and constant interference with the freedom of movement of
 Smit to Baston,  Mar. and  Apr. ; Baston to Smit,  Mar. : CAD, NTS
/.
 W. S. Long, for compol, to SNA,  May , CAD, NTS /.
 Smuts to M. C. Gillett,  May , in Van der Poel, ed., Selections, VI, pp. –.
 Union of South Africa, Report of the inter-departmental committee on the social, health and
economic conditions of urban natives (Pretoria, ), p. , para. .
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Natives giv[ing] rise to a burning sense of grievance and injustice which has
an unsettling effect on the Native population as a whole’. The committee
recommended the pass laws’ abolition, but that ‘in the meantime instructions
should be issued to authorised ofﬁcers to enforce the Pass Laws only when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that some other offence has been or is
about to be committed’. The committee thus prepared the ground for the
pass laws enforcement suspension order, and its reformist recommendations
were beholden not merely to the predilections of administrative insiders like
Smit, but drew force from the inﬂuence of the Africans’ representatives who
were an important component of Smuts’s narrow pro-war parliamentary
majority, from the liberal voices among the ‘ European and  Native
witnesses’ the committee examined, and from the concerns about African
disaffection that further broadened the political space for the articulation,
beginning with Smuts himself, of a more sympathetic policy towards Africans.
The short-term suggestion that enforcement be eased pending consideration of
a longer-term abolition of the pass laws was also informed by the NRC, which at
the end of  debated and approved a motion deprecating the ‘high-handed
manner in which Police raids for liquor and passes or permits are carried out in
some of the large urban centres . . . creat[ing] a feeling of antagonism on the
part of Africans towards the police’ – a debate that ended with Councillor
Baloyi’s asking that ‘the Government try an experiment; suspend the Pass Laws
for a month or two and see what happens, see whether it is not going to lead to
an improvement in the position’. It was, Baloyi said, almost ‘as if the police want
to antagonise the people against the Government because our people think the
Government is doing these things’ – a conclusion that only reinforced the
view Smit had been coming to independently.
Meanwhile, through  and into  reports continued of ‘subversive
propaganda’ among Africans, with particular attention being paid to Natal and
the Transvaal, which bordered on neutral Portugal’s Mozambique colony, ‘from
which the enemy [could] operate into the Union’. Japan’s entry into the war
at the end of  and the additional pressure this placed on Indian Ocean
defence initiated a second peak of ofﬁcial concern about Africans’ loyalty, and
led to further efforts to temper the enforcement of intrusive discriminatory
laws. Certainly in communities, such as in the Sibasa area in the northern
Transvaal, where people faced drought and possible famine, and were weighing
up whether or not to join the native military corps (NMC) for war service in
non-combatant roles, police raids and arrests in February  for beer brewing
were viewed by NMC recruiter, Major T. E. Liefeldt, as ‘quite unnecessary and
uncalled for’. At both district and national level, renewed pressure was placed
 Ibid., p. , paras. –.  Ibid., p. , para. .
 Smit to compol,  Oct. ; SNA to compol,  May , enclosing extract of NRC
proceedings: CAD, SAP //.
 Smit to Alport,  Feb. , CAD, NTS /.
 K E I T H S H E A R
on the police in early  to desist from such actions. The SAP, reeling from
the recent discovery that numbers of its members had been plotting a coup
attempt, was now widely regarded within the NAD as not merely heavy-footed
but intentionally seeking to provoke disaffection. Either way, as in the previous
crisis moment of June , the state itself was more likely than deliberate
subversive enemy propaganda to create disaffection among Africans, and
incidents like that at Sibasa forced senior ofﬁcials yet again to confront this
unpalatable truth.
Smit was receiving other reports in February  ‘that the outlook of the
Natives on the war [was] deteriorating’, with ‘bad news from overseas’ being
compounded by ‘subversive propaganda . . . disseminated among them’
suggesting that German, Italian, or Japanese rule would be more benign; that
Africans volunteering for war service were being ‘put in the ﬁring line’ but not
trusted with weapons; and that they should ‘go slow and . . . adopt an attitude of
passivity’. In asking his CNCs to investigate these reports, Smit tried to strike a
reassuring note. ‘We must not, of course’, he urged, perhaps seeking to
convince himself as much as his subordinates, ‘allow ourselves to be stampeded
by rumours that may be quite untrue’. Nonetheless, he confessed, ‘my own
impression is that the attitude of the Natives has deteriorated’. The ‘war
situation’ was ‘undoubtedly causing us all a great deal of anxiety’, and ‘loyal
ofﬁcers’ had ‘to maintain the utmost vigilance . . . and to report any indications
of disaffection or unrest at once’ so that ‘immediate steps may be taken to deal
with any danger that may arise’.
In their follow-up responses, Smit’s ofﬁcers reported a wary indifference
among Africans rather than any positive hostility. ‘While they profess to be loyal
and probably are’, wrote one, ‘they just take the line of least resistance and do
nothing’. The senior NAD ofﬁcial on the Witwatersrand summarized the
broader ﬁndings effectively:
Many Natives are sceptical about their future. They do not put much faith in our
promises for post war amelioration, and cannot see what they are likely to gain by
joining in the war now, and making sacriﬁces to that end. There is an inclination to
think that any change of regime cannot leave them in a worse position than they are
now. These people are not aggressive in their views. Perhaps their attitude is best
deﬁned as indifferent.
 Liefeldt to SNA,  Feb. ; Rogers to SNA,  Feb. , covering statement by
Liefeldt,  Feb. ; Rogers to SNA, Mar. , covering reports by Northern Areas NCs:
CAD, NTS /.
 Smit to Alport and Smit to Mears,  Feb. , CAD, NTS /.
 N. A. Ogilvie, additional NC, Louis Trichardt, to Rogers,  Mar. , CAD, NTS
/.
 Lowe to Smit,  Mar. , CAD, NTS /. See also Roth, ‘“If you”’, pp. –; B.
Hirson, ‘Not pro-war and not anti-war, just indifferent: South African blacks in the Second
World War’, Critique,  (), pp. –.
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Smit was fearful, however, that in the event of an Axis invasion Africans’
‘attitude’ would shift from apparent indifference to aggression, and he could
no longer rely on direct informal representations to the police to secure
their co-operation in ensuring that active African hostility was not inﬂamed
by insensitive administration of the pass laws. Possibly, too, with elections due
in mid- for the NRC and white representatives of Africans in parliament,
the authorities sought means to reward incumbents facing challenges
from more radical contestants. Finally, then, in May , Smit’s minister,
Reitz, convinced his colleague, Justice Minister Steyn, to issue an order
speciﬁcally instructing the police not to demand passes from Africans in
several of South Africa’s major urban centres ‘except in circumstances
where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the Native concerned
has committed or is about to commit some other offence [than that of
being abroad without a pass] of sufﬁcient gravity to justify such action’. Night-
time curfew regulations remained in force, but here too ‘discretion’ was
urged.
I V
Had the police welcomed the ministerial order as a recognition that their
diminished strength left them unable to enforce the law, would their actions
and rhetoric have indicated that the suspension hindered rather than helped
them? Within months, for example, Witwatersrand police, citing a ‘crime wave’,
were testing the limits of the order in ‘send[ing] out Sunday afternoon patrols
to round up loafers, drunks etc.’, apparently using the pass laws to make the
arrests, and having to answer to the complaints of vigilant leftist and liberal
critics for doing so. Elsewhere, too, SAP chiefs objected that ‘the limitation
placed upon the Police’ left them ‘almost powerless to deal with idle and
destitute Natives’ to whom they attributed increases in serious crime, thereby
demonstrating precisely why informal requests that they enforce the pass laws
tactfully had failed. ‘[U]nless the Ministerial Order . . . is cancelled’, Natal’s
deputy commissioner Meston wrote in early , referring to Durban, where
fear of invasion had led to a black-out being imposed from mid-,
‘our hands will be hopelessly tied in ﬁghting crime’. Although acknowledging
that Pietermaritzburg, the inland provincial capital, had experienced
 Basner, Am I?, pp. –; P. Walshe, The rise of African nationalism in South Africa (London,
), p. .
 L. Durham, for secretary for justice (SJ), to compol,  May , CAD, SAP //;
P. van der Byl, Top hat to velskoen (Cape Town, ), pp. –.
 SNA to compol,  Jan. , encl. H. M. Basner to SNA,  Dec. ; decompol,
Witwatersrand, to compol,  Jan. : CAD, SAP //. Crime on the Witwatersrand
and in Pretoria was the focus of a contemporaneous inder-departmental committee, chaired by
Johannesburg Chief Magistrate S. H. Elliott, but this did not, as Davenport, ‘South Africa’s
Janus’, p. , suggests, lead rapidly to the wholesale withdrawal of the suspension order.
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‘no appreciable increase in crime’ following the order, Meston complained that
Africans did
not look upon the non-enforcement of the Regulations as a privilege but as a
victory scored over the authorities and in most instances their manner is
deﬁnitely one of deﬁance . . . Many [white] homes in Pietermaritzburg are, owing
to the war, without their menfolk and naturally having Natives roaming around
all hours of the night results in the women developing a justiﬁed sense of insecurity
and fear.
In a report to Smit, however, Natal’s CNC qualiﬁed Meston’s analysis,
concluding ‘that the re-imposition of the Pass Laws’ would be a ‘retrograde
step’, neither ‘justiﬁable or politic’. With the measures it had taken to
extend its knowledge of Africans’ conditions, and given its enhanced
authority within the state, Smit’s NAD was now much better placed than it had
been in  to prevail over the SAP. Acting commissioner Baston thus had to
inform his deputy that the minister of justice had decided to maintain the
suspension order in Natal’s two main cities but would review the evidence after
a further ‘month or two’. Baston claimed that he himself was ‘generally
reluctant to return to the old system of pass hunting’, but saw no alternative to
at least a selective ‘retightening [of] the pass laws’ (to which the minister
assented) to improve state control over a burgeoning informal settlement area
like Durban’s Cato Manor, which he regarded as ‘a natural hiding place for
natives wanted by Police’. Over many decades, the pass laws had become a
core instrument of white supremacy to whose absence urban police forces could
not adjust.
Reﬂection within the state on the experiment of relaxing the pass laws
focused in January  when Donald Molteno, one of the three MPs
representing Africans, gave notice of a motion calling on the government to
consider repealing the pass laws in their entirety on the grounds that they were
undemocratic, unjust, ‘inconsistent with . . . healthy economic development’,
and caused ‘interracial friction’. Molteno had not merely taken it upon
himself to speak for Africans; his motion drew on resolutions passed at both the
recent NRC session and ANC conference, and illustrates how African protest
and white liberal advocacy ﬂowed in the same channel. In response, police
divisions were asked to report on trends in crime after May  in areas subject
to the ministerial order. Chief Inspector Baillie, for the Witwatersrand, argued
that prior to the relaxation the pass laws had contained ‘lawless elements’ within
 Meston to compol,  Feb. , CAD, SAP //.
 Smit to compol,  May , encl. acting CNC, Pietermaritzburg, to SNA,  Apr. ,
CAD, SAP //.
 Baston to depcom, Pietermaritzburg,  May , CAD, SAP //.
 Baston to SJ,  Aug. ; L. Durham, for SJ, to compol,  Aug. , CAD, SAP
//.  Smit to Baston,  Jan. , CAD, SAP //.
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segregated ‘Native townships, locations, mine and industrial compounds etc.’,
but subsequently these ‘elements’ had
found their way without hindrance into the European residential areas. They
roamed the streets under the very eyes of the Police who were no longer able to
control their movements and whose presence was no longer respected by those bent
on crime. They were able to extend their margin of safety to the very doorstep of
Police Stations. This naturally afforded such Natives an opportunity of studying
police movements etc., thus enabling them to strike at any weak points.
Because being in or seeking paid employment was the only legitimate reason,
from whites’ perspective, for Africans to be in towns, passes were issued or
endorsed by ofﬁcials and employers, and Baillie unsurprisingly held ‘passless
Natives’ to be ‘as a rule of the criminal type’. This was a reassertion of the
notorious Stallard doctrine – which informed pre-war urban legislation and was
named after the chairman of the  commission whose report articulated
it – that towns, being ‘essentially the white man’s creation’, should only be
accessible to Africans ‘willing . . . to minister to the needs of the white man’ and
who would ‘depart . . . when [they] cease[d] so to minister’. Arrests effected
under different laws showed, Baillie wrote, that ‘[t]he Natives concerned, with
very few exceptions, were unemployed and could be regarded as “won’t works”
and had no pass or document of identity and a very large percentage bore
criminal records’. For Baillie, the ministerial order, coming on top of the
reductions in the SAP’s strength, had ‘aggravated the already serious position
which was being experienced at the hands of the Native criminal’.
The Free State’s deputy commissioner, P. G. de Wit, reported that in
Bloemfontein the relaxation had caused a fall in the number of Africans
arrested from , in the period May  to December , to , in
the period May  to December  – a reduction of nearly  per cent that
reﬂects the signiﬁcance of the pass laws’ contribution to the ubiquity of the
police in Africans’ lives. In Bloemfontein, as elsewhere, whites and the police
discerned a corresponding increase in ‘rowdyism’ and ‘trespassing’, and the
adoption of ‘a deﬁant attitude’ by Africans after May . De Wit too thought
repeal ‘impracticable, and that some measure of restriction to control the
natives [was] imperative to avoid chaos’ and ‘for the welfare of both races’. As
the under-SNA concluded in a minute to Smit summarizing these and similar
reports from other police divisions, and following a discussion of them with
police headquarters: ‘From a Police point of view identiﬁcation of Natives is
vitally important as also control of the ingress of Natives to urban centres and
their environs. If, therefore, the present pass system is to be abolished an
effective alternative scheme should replace it. I agree with this view.’
 Hindson, Pass controls, p. .
 Baillie to compol,  Jan. , CAD, SAP //.
 P. G. de Wit to compol,  Feb. , CAD, SAP //.
 Mears to SNA,  Feb. , CAD, SAP //.
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In these and Meston’s earlier reports may be discerned a sense of outrage at
the loss of respect the divisional chiefs perceived in Africans for the police, the
state, and whites more broadly. The reports reveal a psychology of white
supremacy offended by Africans’ apparent ingratitude in abusing a reform
that administrators conceived of as a ‘privilege’; within the top-down framework
of ‘trusteeship’, Africans were not meant to take their destinies into their
own hands, or act as if they had won concessions or ‘a victory scored over the
authorities’, but should have responded in ways that gave ﬁtting prominence to
whites’ magnanimity and disinterestedness. The deﬁance these ofﬁcers
identiﬁed may have been symptomatic of the militancy Africans were showing
in many other spheres – in workplaces, informal settlements, and public
transport boycotts, and in the ‘claims’ to ‘full citizen rights’, and ‘demands’
for the removal of all ‘discriminatory legislation’ (including the pass laws), that
the ANC had adopted at its recent December  conference – but to them
it afforded a glimpse of the loss of white personal, collective, and institutional
authority that a permanent abolition of the pass laws would cause. In
communicating the belief that they were under siege – observed by black
‘lawless elements’ at their ‘very doorstep[s]’ – the police were not merely
responding to but leading white public opinion, and they had clearly
succeeded in transferring some of their anxiety to Smit’s deputy, thus
presaging a ﬁrmer response in the House of Assembly to Molteno’s motion
by Piet van der Byl, who had replaced Reitz as minister of native affairs in early
.
Molteno’s call for the pass laws’ repeal received a few hours of
parliamentary time on  March  in an adjourned debate that never
came to a vote but in which Van der Byl signalled that he would support
neither the motion nor the amendment of the opposition National party
(NP). Moving his motion, Molteno cited a speech in which Reitz two years
earlier had ‘“found that nothing [was] so conducive to irritation, to bad
feeling, to hatred, to disturbance of race relations between black and white,
than the Pass Laws where they [were] administered”’. The pass laws, Reitz had
said, were causing whites to ‘“contract a slave state mentality”’, leading
Africans in turn ‘“to contract a permanent hatred and dislike for the
Europeans”’ that would make for ‘“a sorry country”’ in future. For Molteno,
the May  order was a ‘relaxation of [the pass laws’] administration’
only that did not touch disabilities ‘quite out of tune with modern
conceptions’ that Africans experienced in needing permission ‘in [their]
own country’ to seek and hold employment, travel about, or reside where they
wanted.
 Africans’ claims in South Africa, reprinted in T. Karis and G.M. Carter, eds., From protest to
challenge: a documentary history of African politics in South Africa, –, II: Hope and challenge,
– (Stanford, CA, ), pp. –.
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For the NP, by contrast, it was ‘extraordinary that the hands of the police
should be tied’, leading to ‘a chaotic state of affairs’ in which ‘[n]o white
man in Pretoria or Johannesburg dare[d] leave his house alone for an hour
or two without the place being broken into’. Excoriating ‘the increasing
signs of detribalisation, inﬂux into the larger cities and large-scale vagrancy
prevailing amongst the native population’, the NP demanded: ‘effective
control over the movements of natives’, underpinned by the issuing of
identiﬁcation cards and the creation of a ‘population register’ that would
‘once and for all deﬁnitely establish the dividing line between white and
non-white in South Africa’; ‘a system for licensing and rationing labour’
fairly among the different economic sectors; and ‘the proper protection of
life and property against large-scale housebreaking and theft especially in
cities’.
Responding to the debate, Van der Byl sought to steer between Molteno’s
position and the NP’s. He accepted that the pass laws were ‘irksome’ to
Africans, but complained that reformist rhetoric implied they ‘were solely
brought into operation with a view to repressing and forcing down the native
and keeping him under control in an unfair way’. In stating that ‘it [was]
time’ this implication was disputed, he acknowledged the inﬂuence of
reformist opinion in shaping more recent public debate and policy. Against
the reformers, the minister advanced three arguments. First, he revived the
old NAD paternalist justiﬁcation that the pass laws protected, and ensured
ofﬁcial ‘guidance’ was available to, ‘unsophisticated’ Africans confronting ‘the
complicated machinery of [urban] civilisation’ and potentially ‘unscrupulous
employers’. Second, like the police, he cited the Stallard principle that
there was
no place in the town for the man who does not wish to work and who does not wish
to pay his way. There is no place for the man who wants to come into town and live by
his wits, and in view of the difﬁculties of identiﬁcation in regard to the average
native, some documentary proof must be carried by him to show his standing in the
community in order to protect the native who is doing a steady job of work and in
order to protect the local authority which has to foot the bill. I feel that, however
undesirable it may be from the ethical point of view, it is necessary to have these pass
laws as conditions are at present.
Finally, Van der Byl said, while the  ‘concession’ had attempted to address
‘the apparent oppressiveness of the pass laws’, it had ‘not led to the unqualiﬁed
success we had hoped for’. Africans had been given ‘a chance to prove their
goodwill and appreciation of this concession which would have strengthened
my hand to have made further concessions’, but the ‘very substantial increase in
serious crime’ and evidence of tax evasion ‘show[ed] that . . . undue advantages
[had] been taken of this relaxation’. The minister ended by warning that the
future of the ‘relaxation’ was in the balance; he did not ‘wish to withdraw it’, but
there was ‘a strong movement on foot for the strict re-application of the various
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control provisions of the law’. Although his language was more moderate, it
echoed police management’s in blaming Africans for their failure to respect
white supremacy when not physically compelled to do so, and implied that the
experiment would not endure. Certainly, this is how the ANC saw the debate,
for it subsequently joined the Communist party in a campaign that aimed to
gather a million signatures for a petition to parliament to abolish the pass
laws.
Yet, the suspension continued for another two years with the police arguing
that the pass laws’ ‘abolition [was] impossible unless it [was] substituted by
another method of registration whereby proper control over the Natives
[could] be exercised’; that they ‘fail[ed] to see what punishment other than
imprisonment [could] be imposed upon a native who [was] out of work’; and
that the pre-May  enforcement procedure be resuscitated.On  January
, the post-war police commissioner, Robert Palmer, met the ministers of
native affairs and justice together with Smit (by then no longer SNA) and the
secretary for justice in Cape Town to discuss the issue. Palmer was asked to
supply statistics on the ‘volume of crime in . . . larger centres’ during  to
, including increases in the size of the urban African population and
‘ﬁgures in regard to serious crime and crime committed by Natives’. On
 January , a police deputy commissioners’ conference met in the
presence of the SNA and concluded that the May  restriction be
withdrawn, subject to Van der Byl’s approval, but that ‘the Police should
exercise their authority in this regard very sparingly, that there should be no
wholesale raids and that the provisions of the respective Pass Laws should be
employed only as a last resource in special cases’. Van der Byl ﬁnally did agree
on  March , provided ‘that the Police should exercise their powers very
sparingly’, and added that ‘no public statement should be made on this
matter’. The latter stipulation may have been to prevent the credit for the
lifting of the ministerial order being claimed by the NP, which since the debate
on Molteno’s motion had accused Smuts’s ministers of having ‘enfeebled the
police’ by refusing to allow them to enforce the law, causing their ‘failure to
deal adequately with native criminals’. Equally, however, the government did
not want openly to break with reformist opinion; as late as November ,
replying to a petition by some , British students protesting against South
Africa’s ‘policies of racial injustice and discrimination’, it insisted that it
 House of Assembly Debates (HAD), , cols. ,–.
 Walshe, Rise, p. .
 Depcom, Transvaal division, to compol,  Apr. and May ; compol to SJ,  Dec.
: CAD, SAP //.
 Palmer to Long,  Jan. , CAD, SAP //.
 Palmer to SJ,  Jan. , CAD, SAP //.
 SJ to compol,  Mar. , CAD, SAP //.
 HAD, , cols. ,–; cutting from Transvaler,  Feb. , CAD, SAP //.
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remained its ‘steadfast endeavour . . . to relax the Pass Laws wherever poss-
ible’.
V
This history of the relaxation of pass laws enforcement shows how extensive
were the obstacles within the state itself to the top-down reform proposals
and initiatives of the s. Formal high-level measures, backed by the commit-
ment and vigilance of reformers beyond the state bureaucracy, were needed
to ensure that established policing practices of white supremacy did not
either inadvertently or deliberately undermine the government’s more urgent
priorities in the early s. And yet, in this case, the concession –made initially
in response to overriding concerns about Africans’ disaffection, and with the
support of inﬂuential white liberals informed by organized black opinion –
outlasted by at least two years the critical wartime necessity that had attended its
introduction.
Why was the suspension continued well after the immediate danger of early
 had passed? A diminished policing capability is not the answer because
the police themselves said the suspension only aggravated their difﬁculties.
While the issue of African loyalty had made it ‘politic’ to relax the pass laws, the
principal determinant of the decision to maintain the relaxation was the
momentum of reformist opinion and organization, which pushed steadily if
ultimately unsuccessfully against the gathering resources of reaction: the mid-
s shift in the focus of white politics from the war question to that of how
to renovate white supremacy; the gradual recovery of the SAP’s credibility
institutionally within the state, and also among the white public, which whether
for or against the war had had cause to question the police’s probity; and
the government’s own ambivalence about reform, especially in the face of
NP propaganda. Possibly, too, as post-war non-mining industrial expansion
proceeded, providing jobs for demobilizing whites, the correspondingly greater
demand for urban African labour factored in ofﬁcial calculations in maintain-
ing the suspension, although no direct evidence substantiates this point.
Indeed, as long as workforce entrants thus ‘minister[ed] to the needs of the
white man’, their increase was not incompatible with urban pass law
enforcement.
That the opposition from the later war period criticized the government for
tying the police’s hands signalled how the Nationalists hoped to redraw the
rhetorical battle lines of post-war white politics on their own terms of apartheid
baasskap. In this, they were vindicated, for Smuts’s government, however coyly
it ended the suspension of pass laws enforcement in March , found
itself engaging in highly visible and internationally embarrassing domestic
 South Africa House, South African government’s policy for non-Europeans: reply to petition
submitted to his majesty the king (London, ), pp. , .
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repression – including restricting Indians’ rights to purchase land, violently
subduing a landmark strike by black mineworkers in August , and charging
much of the Communist party’s national leadership with sedition in November
 – while simultaneously seeking to maintain reformist support.
Smuts’s reactionary measures lastingly alienated mainstream African poli-
ticians from constructive participation in the NRC, and increasingly too from
the white liberals with whom they had worked in the earlier s. But Smuts
himself was not altogether done with reform. On  August , the last day of
the mineworkers’ strike, the government announced the appointment of a
native laws commission, chaired by Henry Fagan, a supreme court judge and
former minister of native affairs, to consider urban African policy, the operation
of the pass laws, and the migrant labour system. A judicial commission along
such lines had been proposed by a supporter of Molteno’s motion in the 
parliamentary debate, so this was not an insigniﬁcant gesture. Here, the
labour needs of secondary industry were explicitly considered. Although Smuts
wrote that he hoped the commission would ‘not unduly delay their inquiry and
report, as they bear closely on the very essence of our Native troubles’, which
were ‘getting [South Africans] into ill odour’ at the United Nations, he also
sought through its appointment both to defer the demands of reformers who
continued to support him, including some of the more talented members of his
cabinet, and to prevent the NP from further making ‘native policy’ an issue with
which to assail him domestically. Smuts succeeded in stringing along his white
liberal followers, for whom he was much the better of two evils, but, as the
outcome of the  contest revealed, he failed to neutralize ‘native policy’ as
an electoral issue.
As to the pass laws, the political limits of reform from above were inherent in
the idea of ‘trusteeship’, which even in its sincerest guise took white supremacy
for granted. Smuts, Reitz, Smit (who entered parliament in  as a member
of Smuts’s party), and even the instinctively reactionary Van der Byl had all
expressed the desire, beyond the immediate necessity of wartime emergency,
for a white supremacy that Africans might acknowledge without being
compelled to do so and that would be as a consequence all the more secure.
In holding to this improbable course they tacked towards Molteno’s un-
compromising liberalism but ended on the restorationist rocks of the SAP and
the NP.
 J. Barber, South Africa’s foreign policy, – (London, ), pp. –; H. J.
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